June 20, 2026: Ukraine’s success against Russian tanks and armored vehicles again revived predictions that tanks are obsolete. Tanks are still relevant and the Russian losses were the result of poor deployment of armored units as well as design differences in Russian tanks that make them much more vulnerable than Western tanks like the American M1, German Leopard or Israeli Merkava. Most Russian armored vehicles were lost while they were on the move, or stationery without adequate infantry support. The first Russian armored units going into Ukraine were told the population would be friendly or neutral. The reality was that the Ukrainians were well armed, hostile and using tactics the Russians were unaware of and unprepared to deal with. Thousands of Russian vehicles were destroyed in the first month, most of them armored, including some of the most modern Russian tanks plus a few that may have been taken from museums.

Most of the Ukrainian anti-tank weapons were portable and carried into combat by teams of soldiers, many of them recent volunteers. Many volunteers had no military experience at all. The few days training they received was also an evaluation of their suitability for combat duty. This usually began carrying ammo, including anti-tank missiles and projectiles. These volunteers demonstrated an ability to follow instructions and take cover or resume movement when ordered. Sometimes volunteers were selected for combat duty because they knew the area where their anti-tank team would be operating. These anti-tank teams suffered far fewer casualties than the Russians, even after the Russians became aware of the ambush risk. Ukrainians were still able to attack. For one thing most of the portable anti-tank weapons could accurately hit moving vehicles 300 or more meters away. The guided missiles, like Javelin and NLAW, were fire and forget. The NLAW had a max range of 600 meters and Javelin 2,500 meters. The Ukrainians were creative with their ambush tactics and the Russians who survived them noted that the Ukrainians were always better prepared and one or more steps ahead of Russian commanders. The Russians were losing six dead for every Ukrainian fighter and that included soldiers killed by rocket and ballistic missile attacks away from the combat zone.

Russian armored vehicles had some unique vulnerabilities not found on their NATO counterparts. The Russian tanks used an auto-loader for the main 125mm gun with a magazine of shells in the crew compartment, the turret and body of the tank beneath it, as well as spare shells for the crew to refill the autoloader magazine. If any anti-tank weapon penetrated into the crew compartments, especially the turret, one or more of the 125mm shells were exposed and likely to explode. If one shell went, all those near the autoloader did as well. This usually meant the turret would literally be blown off the tank and the entire crew killed. Javelin and NLAW were designed to attack the less protected top of the turret or body of the tank, which at the very least destroyed the engine or wounded some of the three-man crew. The primary Russian infantry armored vehicle was the BMP, which was poorly protected against anti-tank weapons, especially the ones the Ukrainians were using. You did need a top-attack ATGM to destroy a BMP. Trucks carrying supplies, especially fuel and ammo, equipment or personnel were even more vulnerable.

Even when the Russians knew they were facing well-armed defenders, their infantry was not well trained in how to scout for and protect their armored vehicles from ambush. NATO tank units train using infantry who know what to look for and are able to call in heavy fire from the armored vehicles they are escorting. NATO forces also have more small UAVs to do some of the scouting. The Russians had few such UAVs and those that were available were poorly used and often shot down by the Ukrainians.

Ukrainian forces have lots of armored vehicles, most of them Ukrainian–improved Russian designs. Ukrainian tank tactics are more practical and more likely to overcome defenders; plus Ukrainian civilians are everywhere and generally eager to let their troops know what’s going on in the area.

After 2022 Ukraine developed full-scale drone warfare. Modern warfare has been radically changed by the introduction of First Person View/FPV. These drones are an omnipresent aerial threat to armored vehicles and infantry on foot. Each FPV drone costs less than a thousand dollars. Operators use the video camera on the drone to see what is below and find targets. Armed FPV operators are several kilometers away to decide when their quadcopter FPV drones will drop explosives on an armored vehicle, which has thinner armor on top, or infantry in the open or in trenches. To do so the drone operators often operate in pairs with one flying behind the other and concentrating on the big picture while seeking a likely target. When such a target is found by the reconnaissance drone, the armed drone is directed to the target. The two FPV drone operators are usually in the same room or tent and can take control of new drones, which are lined up and brought outside for launch when needed. The reconnaissance drones are often unarmed so they can spend more time in the air looking for targets.

The Ukrainians developed the FPV drone in 2022 when only a few FPV drone attacks were recorded. The Ukrainian Army was the first to appreciate the potential of FPV drones. By the summer of 2023 the Russian Army also began to use FPV drones in greater numbers. Since then, the number of FPV drone attacks has grown exponentially on both sides. By early 2024, there were over 4,000 Russian FPV drone attacks monthly and the Russians kept video records of each one. Only twelve percent of those attacks led to the destruction of the target, which could be a vehicle or group of infantry or even a sniper who was firing through a window from inside a building. In this case the armed FPV drone would fly through the window and explode in the room the sniper was in. The only defense from this was having a nearby open door the sniper could run to or dive through as the FPV drone approached. Sometimes that isn’t possible because the armed FPV drone is coming down from above the window and then in. You don’t see those coming until it is too late.

Many FPV drone attacks miss completely or barely and inflict no injuries. All the FPV drone activity does make sounds and troops in the vicinity fear the sounds and feel quite anxious when those are around. While only twelve percent of FPV drone attacks caused fatalities or serious injuries, another fifteen percent did some damage. About twenty percent missed their target, or it was not possible to prove what happened.

Both sides now use the FPV drones but there are substantial differences on how the FPV drones are put to work in combat. The Ukrainians seek out high-value targets like armored vehicles, electronic warfare equipment, anti-aircraft systems and storage sites for munitions or other supplies. Russian trucks carrying supplies are another prime target.

This new threat had led to work on improved defensive measures. First priority goes to Electronic Counter Measures/ECM systems which armored vehicles, trucks and even troops on foot require to survive FPV drone attacks. There is another problem when the attacker changes the control frequencies their drone uses for effective remote control. This is more of a problem for Russian defenders than Ukrainian as the Russians are controlled by slow bureaucratic leaders and production systems while the Ukrainians are much more flexible. Many FPV drones have backup systems for these situations that include returning to the launch site or completing an attack on a target that has been sighted and the FPV drone is already headed for. This means the range of the defensive ECM signal must be more than 100 meters to avoid getting hit by a FPV drone programmed to continue heading for the target if its control signal was jammed or lost because of FPV drone equipment failure.

Another requirement for adequate defense is the presence of metal screens or grills to defeat FPV drone attacks that get past the protective ECM signals. Note that the thinnest armor is over areas on the top side of the tank, particularly the turret and especially behind the turret, where the engine is. Damage the engine so that the tank can no longer move, and the suddenly immobile target becomes easier to destroy. Tank crews will often abandon their immobile vehicle. Then there are additional effective protective measures for vehicles. These include Barbeque and Bubbles structures erected over tanks and other armored vehicles to halt or diminish the impact of drone attacks.

Another way to improve FPV drone defenses is to modify existing Active Protection System/APS equipment to recognize and attack FPV drones. Most NATO nations now have APS on their tanks. Germany successfully completed acceptance tests of the Israeli Trophy APS they were purchasing for their Leopard 2 tanks. The October 2021 tests consisted of firing ATGMs Anti-Tank Guided Missiles, RPGs rocket propelled grenades and shells from tank guns or artillery that often fire such shells equipped with shaped charge warheads at tanks, at a Trophy equipped Leopard 2.

This is not the first Leopard 2 to use an APS. Turkish Leopard 2 and M60 tanks were equipped with the Ukrainian Zaslon APS in 2018 and were successful enough for Turkey to obtain a manufacturing license to build Zaslon. Several other countries have ordered Zaslon because it is one of the few APS systems that proved itself in combat. Moreover, Zaslon is more flexible to install as it uses individual modules and can be used on tanks equipped with ERA Explosive Reactive Armor. On the downside, Zaslon will injure nearby infantry, which is a major problem for many nations. Zaslon has been in service for as long as Trophy and worked against Russian weapons in 2015 but saw little exposure to combat after that until the Turks noticed it.

Trophy is considered the most useful and combat proven APS, and over 2,000 systems have been installed or are on order for Israeli Merkava, American M1 and Leopard 2 tanks as well as other Israeli and American armored vehicles. For example, in mid-2020 American M1 tanks arrived in Europe equipped with Trophy APS. The Israeli manufacturer began delivering 261 M1 APS kits in late 2019. These equip all the M1 tanks in four combat brigades. A few Trophy-equipped M1s are also available for testing and training.

The United States was late in adopting APS, mainly because few American operated M1 tanks seemed to need it and the army procurement budget was shrinking. By 2012 APS came to be seen as a necessity. In 2018 the army finally got the money to upgrade M1 tanks with Trophy. This came after Trophy had been tested on the M1. Trophy was added at the same time 62 Abrams Reactive Armor Tiles/ARAT were installed to cover the running gear and tracks as additional protection against RPGs, which are often fired at this area to cripple tank mobility. The ARAT tiles add another two tons, in addition to about a ton for Trophy.

Trophy has been around since 2009 and has spent a lot of time exposed to ATGMS and RPGs. Between testing and actual combat, Trophy has been fired on over 6,000 times and successfully defeated all attacks. Trophy has accumulated over a million operating hours so far and no vehicle equipped with Trophy has had a crew member injured. Like earlier active defense systems such as the naval Phalanx, you cannot leave the system on if there is no threat. That wears out the electronics and there is always a small risk of the system being accidentally triggered by something other than a threat.

The U.S. eventually noted that Western tanks, like the M1 and Leopard 2 are increasingly vulnerable to ATGMs and improved RPGs. This was demonstrated in northwest Syria from 2016 to 2018 as Turkey lost over a dozen Leopard 2 and older American M60 tanks to Kornet and other ATGMs. Turkey tried several different defensive solutions but finally selected the Ukrainian Zaslon APS for their tanks. Israel was not considered because since 2000 Turkey has been ruled by an anti-Israel government.

Most tanks in Ukraine have APS because there is still a threat from ATGMs and RPGs. It makes sense to modify existing APS equipment to help deal with the FPV drone threat.