January 19, 2026: Between December 2024 and March 2025, the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier Truman/CVN-75 lost three F-18 aircraft and collided with a cargo ship near the Suez Canal. During this period, one of its escorts, the cruiser Gettysburg/Crisis Group-64 accidentally fired SM-2 antiaircraft missiles at two F-18s. One aircraft was lost, although the pilot ejected. The other F-18 managed to avoid the missile with some expert maneuvering and the last minute deactivation of the missile by the Gettysburg. The cause of this disaster was a malfunctioning IFF/Identify Friend or Foe system on the Gettysburg. The commander of the Truman was relieved; the captain of the Gettysburg was not.

During this period the Truman had far more problems than the Gettysburg. The captain of the Truman lost his job not just because he lost three aircraft and had a collision, but because it was found that key crew members were not adequately trained. This was also a problem with officers and sailors on duty often not being able to sleep much because of the tempo of operations. Lack of sleep has been the cause of many naval mishaps since World War II ended in 1945.

Another issue is the relatively high number of American warship commanders being relieved each year. Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the U.S. Navy has been experiencing a larger number of warship captains getting relieved from command. It's currently over five percent of ship captains a year. At the end of the Cold War, in the late 1980s, the rate was about 3-4 percent a year. So why has the relief rate gone up? The navy thinks it knows why, but there appears to be a number of reasons, many of them having to do with changes in the rating system, where commanders evaluate their subordinates each year.

The navy has queried commanders for new ideas for the evaluation system. One of the more interesting ones is to hold commanders responsible for their evaluations. Thus, when a commander was up for promotion, one of the items considered would be the accuracy of their evaluations. After all, the higher your rank, the more important it is for you to pick the right people for promotion. The navy has also looked at how corporations handle this evaluation process and discovered that it was common to poll subordinates for evaluations as well. The navy was aware that some commanders consult senior NCOs/Chief Petty Officers on evaluations. Chiefs have a lot of experience and see officers a bit differently than more senior officers. Another problem was a major modification in these fitness reports, in which written comments on many aspects of an officer evaluation were changed to a 1-5 ranking system. The new method also forced raters to rank all their subordinates against each other. This was unfair to a bunch of high performing officers who happened to be serving together and being rated by the same commander.

But there are other problems as well. Only a small percentage of reliefs have to do with professional failings, like a collision or serious accident, failing a major inspection or just continued poor performance. Most reliefs were, and still are, for adultery, drunkenness or theft. With more women aboard warships, there have been more reliefs for, as sailors like to put it, zipper failure. There may have been more than are indicated, as sexual misconduct is often difficult to prove, and a captain who is having zipper control problems often has other shortcomings as well. Senior commanders traditionally act prudently and relieve a ship commander who demonstrates a pattern of minor problems and who they lack confidence in.

Most naval officers see the problem not of too many captains being relieved, but too many unqualified officers getting command of ships in the first place. Not every naval officer qualified for ship command, only a small percentage of commissioned officers, gets one. The competition for ship commands is pretty intense. This, despite the fact that officers know that whatever goes wrong on the ship, the captain is responsible.

It's a hard slog for a new ensign/officer rank O-1 to make it to a ship command. For every hundred ensigns entering service, about 90 will stay and make it to O-4/Lieutenant Commander, usually after about nine years of service. About 67 of those ensigns will eventually get to serve as XO/executive officer, the number two officer on a ship, after 10-12 years of service. Some 69 of those ensigns will make it to O-5/ Commander, where it first becomes possible to command a frigate or destroyer. About 38 of those hundred ensigns will get such a command, usually after 18-20 years of service, and for about 18 months. About 22 of those ensigns will make it to O-6/Captain after 20-21 years of service. But only 11 of those ensigns, now captains, will get a major seagoing command of a cruiser or destroyer squadron. Officers who do well commanding a ship will often get to do it two or three times before they retire after about 30 years of service.

But with all this screening and winnowing, why are more unqualified officers getting to command ships, and then getting relieved because they can't hack it? Some point to the growing popularity of mentoring by senior officers, that smaller percentage that makes it to admiral. While the navy uses a board of officers to decide which officers get ship commands, the enthusiastic recommendation of one or more admirals does count. Perhaps it counts too much. The navy is still quick to relieve any ship commander that screws up, one naval tradition that should never be tampered with. Up until that point, it is prudent not to offend any admirals by implying that their judgment of up and coming talent is faulty. In the aftermath of these reliefs, it often becomes known that the relieved captain had a long record of problems. But because he was blessed by one or more admirals, these infractions were overlooked. The golden boys tend to be very personable and, well, look good. The navy promotion system is organized to rise above such superficial characteristics, but apparently the power, and misuse, of mentoring, has increasingly corrupted the process.

In some respects, there have been fewer reliefs. It's now common to leave a captain in charge after a major incident. When the destroyer Cole was hit by a terrorist bomb in a Yemen harbor in 2000, the captain was not immediately relieved. This is part of a new pattern which makes many naval officers uneasy. Officers, and sailors, would be more disturbed if the rate of captains being relieved went down. No captain is perfect, and crew members feel more comfortable if they know that their boss will quickly get the axe if there is a major problem.