December 26, 2025: Last July an Iranian drone attack killed a PJAK/Party of Free Life of Kurdistan gunman, which caused PJAK members to retaliate. This and related violence indicated a breakdown in the 2011 ceasefire. PJAK insisted it would not disarm or dissolve like the PKK, and would with violence if threatened, putting itself for a more active political and militant situation inside Iranian Kurdistan.

The aftermath of the June 2025 Iran–Israel and the Turkey/PKK peace negotiations has transformed relationships, pushing PJAK away from hesitation and towards a more active approach. PJAK leaders believe Iran’s increasing use of drones and military pressure stems from concerns that a demilitarized PKK could enable PJAK to intensify operations along the Iran–Iraq border.

In a rare incident, a PJAK fighter was killed in an Iranian drone strike in Iraqi Kurdistan. A PJAK official insisted that no attack on PJAK would go unanswered. The drone attack, which occurred last July, seems to be part of Iran’s crackdown on dissent and stepping up mass arrests and executions of Kurds.

Following the drone strike, there were three armed border clashes in northwestern Iran, leaving several members of the IRGC/Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps dead. Many believe it was PJAK that initiated the fighting in response to the drone strike on the PJAK fighter in Penjwen, while PJAK-affiliated websites released two videos of clashes near Baneh featuring PJAK fighters attacking Iranian border guards. Iranian state media also reported that three border guards were killed on July 21.

Over the past fifteen years, there have been limited clashes between PJAK and the Iranian forces because Iran and PJAK negotiated a ceasefire in 2011. Iran promised to stop executing Kurdish political prisoners if PJAK halted its attacks inside Iran. The 2011 ceasefire between Iran and the PJAK has been violated dozens of times by the Iranian armed forces, and each time the PJAK has responded to these attacks.

In mid-September 2018, Iran killed three PJAK members. This coincided with Iranian ballistic missiles hitting two different factions of the PDK1/Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan in 2018. At that same time, Iran executed three Kurdish activists for the alleged murder of the son of an imam in Marivan. The Islamic Republic’s strikes in 2018 could have been interpreted as a warning to the Iranian Kurdish parties, as well as to the United States and Israel that Iran was willing to use ballistic missiles against enemies of the state. This happened during the Iranian retaliation during the June war when ballistic missiles struck Israel.

July clashes inside Iran occurred while negotiations were ongoing between Turkey and the PKK. Despite apparently earnest negotiations, the drone attack on PJAK was initially blamed on Turkey. However, after an investigation, PJAK shifted its blame to Iran.

Turkish F-16s and drones regularly hit Kurdish forces. This indicated that there was tactical cooperation between Iran and Turkey against PJAK forces. After PKK and Turkey began negotiating, Turkish attacks decreased and then stopped altogether. This bothered Iran because of the possibility that PJAK forces would become more active inside Iran.

PJAK continued to exercise its right to respond to all of the Iranian violence. PJAK is preparing to assume a more assertive and offensive role in Iran and Iranian Kurdistan. This shift is likely to involve not only its military forces, but also expanded recruiting and reorganization.

PJAK insists that, like the SDF in Syria, it will not disband. This indicates that PJAK will continue to operate on a political and military level within Iranian Kurdish politics. Iranian media has also expressed concern over PJAK’s armed activities despite the disarmament of the PKK.

The Iranian drone attack on PJAK reveals that Iran is worried that PJAK will become more active due to both the peace negotiations in Turkey and the weakened Iran after the June war with Israel. PJAK insists that they will not attack Iranian forces unless attacked first. PJAK is not planning to step back and will become more active in the near future.

Fifteen years ago Iran was becoming an increasingly attractive spot for Kurdish separatist rebels. Iraqi Kurdistan's political cooperation with Turkey had improved and that was bad for the PKK/Kurdistan Workers Party. Though the tighter political cooperation had not translated into concerted Iraqi action against the PKK bases in Iraq, it has produced better intelligence for Turkish forces and encouraged Turkish Kurds to pursue political solutions in Turkey. Iran was another matter. The PJAK had long been the PKK's operation in Iran. Occasionally Iranian police arrest PJAK demonstrators and PJAK smugglers moving goods and weapons from Turkey to Iran or from Iraq to Iran, or the other way. However, the Iranian revolution had encouraged other minorities, like the Baluchis on the other side of Iran. With Iran distracted and Turkey ascendant, PJAK bases could be the haven for PKK cadres under pressure from Turkey in northern Iraq.

Further complicating matters in Iraq, powerful Kurdish militias in Kirkuk, Iraq, are threatening to hold a referendum in the oil rich city to settle the dispute over whether Kirkuk is Arab or Kurd. This dispute has been going on for decades, and many fear it could trigger a civil war between Iraqi Arabs and Kurds.