March 26, 2025: Drones, or autonomous vehicles, have been around for over a century, since Robert Whitehead created the first self-propelled torpedo in 1866. It was first used in combat in 1878 when a Russian torpedo boat sank an Ottoman Turk minelaying ship. Since 1866 over 100,000 torpedoes have been produced.

There are many types of drones that operate in the water. The SeaGlider is a two meter long, 52 kg autonomous drone that monitors underwater conditions for up to six months at a time before being recovered to recharge its batteries. There have been few incidents of torpedoes used in combat since 1945. The most recent one was in 2010 when a North Korean midget submarine used a torpedo to sink a South Korean warship. Aircraft use guided missiles at other aircraft and ground targets. Anti-aircraft missiles, like the American Patriot, have been intercepting aircraft and missiles for nearly half a century.

Until the current Ukraine War, the only drones used were military and research models. Wartime pressure to develop more effective weapons led the Ukrainians to develop dozens of military drones. Most of them were cheap and guided by a human operator several kilometers away. These FPV or First Person View drones were a major innovation. The only positive thing to come out of the Ukraine war was the emergence of massive drone warfare. Implementing lessons learned from the Ukraine war, especially the widespread use of drones, forced military leaders worldwide to rethink how their forces are organized, armed and trained. For example a few thousand dollars’ worth of drones can and have destroyed $4.5 million M1 Abrams tanks.

The Americans are not trying to develop and build cheap air-defense drones, which are already being used in Ukraine. The United States could buy them from Ukraine or build them under license in the United States. There are some other issues. In wartime drone designs evolve rapidly. Stockpiling thousands of drones produced in 2024 and 2025 would create a problem when using them a year or more after 2025. The enemy may have built more advanced drones in anticipation of offing them in a surprise attack. The American stockpiled drones would then be less useful because they are older designs. This is especially true with anti-drone drones, a recent development that is still evolving rapidly.

American attempts to adopt the new drone tactics and technology developed, and still developing, in Ukraine have encountered problems. First, the U.S. is not at war and the military bureaucracy has a peacetime attitude towards any new technology. This includes the use of drones in Ukraine and the flood of practical experience and solutions passed by Ukraine. Current U.S. Army drones, when used in Ukraine, often encounter problems the Ukrainian drones don’t. In a wartime situation, Ukrainians have been quick to make changes until they get the results they need.

The American military may want to implement the lessons of drone use in Ukraine, but American defense contractors and manufacturers feel compelled to modify and improve what the Ukrainians have done while they adapt Ukrainian drone tech to something new which United States forces can use and Congress will pay for. This process tends to lower the effectiveness of what the Ukrainians have created, while delaying the product and enriching the contractors and manufacturers. The lesser effectiveness is usually revealed the first time American troops use the U.S. version of Ukrainian drone tech. Something is lost in the tech translation. This is nothing new. It’s been happening for over a century.

Adapting and adopting Ukrainian drone technology means there will be new drone modifications and upgrades for as long as the fighting in Ukraine lasts. These changes come quickly in wartime and always have. In Ukraine, drone designs can be changed in less than a week. This is usually because the Russians have gained an edge with one of their recent tweaks.

While Ukraine has been in the forefront of developing and upgrading drone technology, the Russians have kept up. In war time you either keep up or become an inept underdog that falls farther and farther behind. The Russians have kept most of the time and, when they fail to keep up, suffer heavy losses.

The peacetime American military has no such wartime feedback loop. If someone in the defense procurement establishment says the current American drone tech is good, it is considered officially adequate. Sending U.S. drone adaptations to Ukraine for testing takes place, but often over the objections of some U.S. manufacturers. When tested in combat, some of the U.S. drones failed to deliver. When the Ukraine war ends, there will be no way to adequately test American drones. There may be other wars where American troops are involved and able to test the new drones. But it won’t be in the intensely competitive atmosphere the Ukrainians and Russians created.

Ukraine has been writing the book on drone technology since 2022, with Russia contributing edits in real time. When that atmosphere is not present, the speed of developing new tech or maintaining current drones slows down a lot. This process is at work now as the U.S. Army orders drones based on Ukrainian designs. The American military procurement bureaucracy is infamously slow in adopting and manufacturing new weapons. This is especially true if a weapon was not invented by an American weapons manufacturer. It is feared that the Ukrainian drone revolution will be equally slow in actually reaching Americans soldiers and marines. Many military and Defense Department civilians are aware of this problem and see the drone development and procurement program as an opportunity to show that the United States can do it right and quickly.

It is said that the Ukrainians suggested that the Americans have a toy company manufacture their drones because they are more efficient than the usual defense firms. Also, the toy companies have spare capacity for months before they have to start making toys for the holidays. Early in the war Ukraine relied on civilians in home workshops to design and build drones. Now that Ukraine is building millions of drones a year, most are built in underground factories. Drone manufacturing is a prime target for Russian drones and ballistic missiles.

In early 2024 Ukraine created a new branch of their military, the USF/Unmanned Systems Force. This is in addition to the Ukrainian Air Force that consists of manned aircraft. The USF does not control the drones which Ukrainian forces use regularly but instead contributes to developing new drone models and organizes mass production for those new models that are successful. The U.S. military took note of this but acting on it takes a lot longer for a peacetime military.

Drones were an unexpected development that had a huge impact on how battles in Ukraine's current war are fought. Drones were successful because they were cheap, easily modified, and expendable. Modifications and upgrades could be implemented quickly and inexpensively Both Russian and Ukrainian forces were soon using cheap quadcopter drones controlled by soldiers a few kilometers distant using FPV goggles to see what the drone video camera can see. These drones cost a few hundred dollars each and most carry half a kilogram of explosives. This instantly turns the drone into a flying bomb that can fly into a target and detonate.

These drones are awesome and debilitating weapons when used in large numbers. If a target isn’t moving or requires more explosive power that the drones can supply, one of the drone operators can call in artillery, rocket, or missile fire, or even an airstrike. Larger, fixed wing drones are used for long range, often over a thousand kilometers, operations against targets deep inside Russia.

Ukraine had no problem finding trained drone operators because anyone who plays video games is partially trained already. Ukrainian drone operators tend to use commercial game controllers. This is why when Ukraine recruits new drone operators, they favor those with video game experience.

Drones are used for attack or reconnaissance and surveillance. The recon missions are usually survivable and enable the drone to be reused. All these drones are constantly performing surveillance, which means that both sides commit enough drones to maintain constant surveillance over a portion of the front line, to a depth, into enemy territory, of at least a few kilometers. Longer range drones can track Russian operations hundreds of kilometers behind the front lines. Ukrainian drones have attacked St. Petersburg, which is 1000 kilometers aways.

This massive use of FPV-armed drones has revolutionized warfare in Ukraine and both sides are producing as many as they can. Military leaders in other nations have noted this and are scrambling to equip their own forces with the most effective drones. Not having enough of these to match the number the enemy has in a portion of the front means you are at a serious disadvantage in that area. These drones are still evolving in terms of design and use and are becoming more effective and essential.

One countermeasure that can work for a while is electronic jamming of the drones’ control signal. Drone guidance systems are constantly modified or upgraded to cope with this. Most drones have flight control software that sends drones with jammed control signals back to where they took off to land for reuse. The jammers on the ground can be attacked by drones programmed to home in on the jamming signal. Countermeasures can be overcome and the side that can do this more quickly and completely has an advantage. That advantage is usually temporary because both sides are putting a lot of effort into keeping their combat drones effective on the battlefield.