August 5, 2025:
The United States has finally caught on to need to stockpile and train troops to use drones. The appearance of drone warfare in Ukraine was one of those infrequent revolutions in how wars are fought using new weapons and tactics.
The American military is changing some long held practices. Previously drones were considered equipment, which meant that each drone came with a lot of accessories that required storage and special training for users. Drones now reclassified as munitions are given to troops to use as they see fit. The new policy means that brigade and division commanders have the authority to decide who gets what and to order drones, whatever manufacturer they can find. Paperwork for such purchases has been greatly simplified.
In the past, such policies often led to corrupt acts, like diverting drone funds to personal use. That’s always a problem and it’s up to senior leadership to ensure that periodic audits are conducted and any corrupt individuals discovered be prosecuted.
Most American military personnel have experience with video games and the common types of game controllers. As the Ukrainians already did, the Americans are also telling the troops to use their video game skills as they train to use the drones they are now being issued. The average American soldier sees all this as overdue and a welcome addition to their duties. Brigade and battalion commanders are encouraged to procure as many U.S. made drones as they can and let the troops train with them. Since drones are now considered rounds of ammunition, there are no restrictions on their use for training.
At the same time, the U.S. government is encouraging American firms that can or already are building drones to prepare for larger orders. U.S. drone manufacturers already exist and have manufactured over a million drones for the Ukrainian military. Now American troops have been added to the customer list.
Americans in general are familiar with the Ukrainian use of drones in their war against Russian invaders. One of first Ukrainian drone victories was the use of naval and land based drones to destroy over a third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and force the survivors to take shelter at Russian ports over a thousand kilometers from Crimea. While Russia still occupies Crimea, the area is under siege by Ukrainian drones. Soon Russia will no longer be able to supply Crimea because of this. The Kerch Strait bridge from Russia to Crimea is in bad shape and can only allow limited truck traffic. By the end of 2024 Russia had withdrawn all its ships from Crimea and shut down ship repair facilities there. Ukraine has the means to demolish what is left of the bridge whenever they want to. This will happen when Ukraine decides to blockade Crimea and force the Russians to abandon the peninsula because they cannot supply it.
While drones have long been manufactured in the United States and other NATO nations, these drones were not suitable for the Ukraine War. Ukraine politely declines offers and points out that they are the premier developers and manufacturers of military drones. Currently Ukraine can produce about four million drones a year.
Initially American attempts to adopt Ukrainian drone tactics and technology encountered problems. First, the U.S. was not at war and the military bureaucracy has a peacetime attitude towards any new technology. This includes the use of drones in Ukraine and the flood of practical experience and solutions passed by Ukraine. Then current U.S. Army drones, when used in Ukraine, often encountered problems the Ukrainian drones didn’t. In a wartime situation, Ukrainians have been quick to make changes until they get the results they need.
The American military eventually implemented the lessons of drone use in Ukraine. American defense contractors and manufacturers felt compelled to modify and improve what the Ukrainians have done while they adapted Ukrainian drone tech to something new which United States forces could use and Congress would pay for. This process tends to lower the effectiveness of what the Ukrainians have created, while delaying the product and enriching the contractors and manufacturers. The lesser effectiveness is usually revealed the first time American troops use the U.S. version of Ukrainian drone tech. Something is lost in the tech translation. This is nothing new. It’s been happening for over a century.
The U.S. is currently adapting and adopting Ukrainian drone technology. There will be modifications and upgrades for as long as the fighting in Ukraine lasts. These changes come quickly in wartime and always have. In Ukraine, drone designs can be changed in less than a week. This is usually because the Russians gained an edge with one of their recent tweaks. While Ukraine has been in the forefront of developing and upgrading drone technology, the Russians have kept up. In war time you either keep up or become an inept underdog that falls farther and farther behind. The Russians noticed that when they fail to keep up, they suffer heavy losses.
The peacetime American military has no such wartime feedback loop. If someone in the defense procurement establishment says the current American drone tech is good, it is officially adequate. Sending U.S. drone adaptations to Ukraine for testing is done, but often over the objections of some U.S. manufacturers. When tested in combat, some of the U.S. drones fail to deliver. American defense contractors don’t like that, but their usual response is to get Congress to approve things that don’t work. When the Ukraine war ends, there will be no way to adequately test American drones. There may be other wars where American troops are involved and able to test the new drones. But it won’t be in the intensely competitive atmosphere the Ukrainians and Russians have created.
Ukraine has been writing the book on drone technology since 2023, with Russia contributing edits in real time. When that atmosphere is not present, the speed of developing new tech or maintaining current drones slows down a lot. This process is at work now as the U.S. Army orders drones based on Ukrainian designs. The American military procurement bureaucracy is infamously slow in adopting and manufacturing new weapons. It is feared that the Ukrainian drone revolution will be equally slow in actually reaching Americans soldiers and marines. Many military and Defense Department civilians are aware of this problem and see the drone development and procurement program as an opportunity to show that the United States can do it right and quickly.
There have been other Ukrainian innovations. In early 2024 Ukraine created a new branch of their military, the Unmanned Systems Force or USF. This is in addition to the Ukrainian Air Force that consists of manned aircraft. The USF does not control the drones Ukrainian forces use regularly, but instead contributes to developing new drone models and organizing mass production for those new models that are successful. The U.S. military took note of this but acting on it takes a lot longer for a peacetime military.
Drones were an unexpected development that had a huge impact on how battles in Ukraine's current war are fought. Drones were successful because they were cheap, easily modified, and expendable. Modifications and upgrades could be implemented quickly and cheaply. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces were soon using cheap, often $500 or less, quadcopter drones controlled by soldiers a few kilometers distant using/First Person Viewing/FPV goggles to see what the camera on the drone can see. Most of these drones carry half a kilogram of explosives, so it can instantly turn the drone into a flying bomb that can fly into a target and detonate. Some drones carry more explosives depending on what is needed to deal with a target.
These drones are awesome and debilitating weapons when used in large numbers. If a target isn’t moving or requires more explosive power that the drones can supply, one of the drone operators can call in artillery, rocket, or missile fire, or even an airstrike. Larger, fixed wing drones are used for long range, often over a thousand kilometers, operations against targets deep inside Russia.
This massive use of FPV-armed drones has revolutionized warfare in Ukraine and both sides are producing as many as they can. Russia initially produced its own drones now after briefly using imported Iranian Shahed-136 drones that cost over $100,000 each. Ukraine demonstrated that you could design and build drones with similar capabilities at less than a tenth of that. The Iranian drone was more complex than it needed to be and even the Russians soon realized this and turned from the Shahed-136 for more capable drones they copied from Ukrainian designs or ones Russians designed.
Ukrainian drone proliferation began when many individual Ukrainians or small teams designed and built drones. The drones served as potential candidates for widespread use and mass production. This proliferation of designers and manufacturers led to rapid evolution of drone capabilities and uses. Those who could not keep up were less successful in combat and suffered higher losses.
Military leaders in other nations have noted this and are scrambling to equip their own forces with the most effective drones. Not having enough of these to match the number the enemy has in a portion of the front means you are at a serious disadvantage in that area. These drones are still evolving in terms of design and use and are becoming more effective and essential. Military leaders worldwide are acting on this new military development and seeking to equip their soldiers with these new weapons and training them in their effective use.