October 23, 2025: Bomb Damage Assessment or BDA has, since the 1914-1918 World War I, sought unsuccessfully to determine how effective air strikes were. During the 1939-45 World War II, air and ground forces which depended on BDA were increasingly frustrated at the inability to get timely and accurate information on how effective their bombing missiles were. This has caused problems within air forces and with the ground forces being supported.

The U.S. Air Force has a well-deserved, and understandable, reputation for advocating military victory achieved mainly with air power. They still do, in spite of a historical record that will not cooperate. That said, the air force has some solid accomplishments to its credit. In some areas it has been extremely successful. This includes gaining and maintaining air supremacy wherever it operates in every American war since 1945.

But when it comes to influencing the war on the ground, the air force is much less dominant. Blame it all on BDA. This is the business of figuring out what to bomb, and what the impact on the enemy is after you bomb. Air force leaders were frequently deceived by the people on the ground being bombed. This began during World War II, when air forces used large scale aerial bombing for the first time, especially against economic targets in Germany between 1943 and 1945.

Right after World War II, the U.S. did a thorough survey of the impact of strategic bombing on Germany and Japan. It was discovered that the impact was far different from what BDA during the war had indicated. The air force vowed to do better next time. But as experience in 1950-3 Korea, 1965-72 Vietnam, 1991 Kuwait, 1999 Kosovo, 2003 Iraq, 2006 Lebanon and Ukraine since 2022 demonstrated, the enemy on the ground continued to have an edge when it came to deceiving the most energetic BDA efforts. The only proven technique for beating the BDA problem was to have people on the ground, up close, checking up on targets, while the fighting was going on. Those with powerful air forces do not want to do this because of the risk of some of their commandos getting killed or captured and because the intel and air force people were sure that they knew what enemy was up to down there by scrutinizing aerial photos. By the 21st Century the wide availability of commercial satellite photos enabled media and individuals to do

People on the ground have consistently demonstrated an ability to deceive aerial surveillance. Even during the early 21st century, when the U.S. developed persistent drone surveillance, the irregular forces they were facing proved capable of reducing the effectiveness of the drone effort. This spotlights another useful fact; air power can be useful on the ground but that happens over time and not quickly. The problem here is with voters and the media. Both demand quick victory and in the U.S. that has developed into the Three Year Rule in that American public support for a war no matter how enthusiastic it was at first, is largely gone after three years. If an air campaign can’t get it done in three years, that effort comes under media and political attack no matter how effective it has been.

But there's another problem. The army and air force have a different outlook on planning and risk. The air force sees warfare as a much tidier, and predictable, affair than does the army. In this respect, the air force and navy are closely aligned. Both are technical services, who are used to exercising more control over their forces than do army generals. The army sees warfare as more unpredictable and has adapted to that unpredictability. The army generals are usually skeptical of the air force's ability to take down foes from the air, and the army personnel are usually right.

Despite being successful high-tech outfits, American air forces, especially the Navy and USAF, frequently have trouble adjusting to changes they do not agree with. When the Cold War ended in 1991 the air force was still largely thinking about continuing to operate as they had done in the Cold War. But the technology and tactics of warfare were changing. The post-Cold War enemy was no longer large, organized forces spread over huge areas. The foes were increasingly irregulars who were harder to spot from the air. The air force reluctantly adapted, in part because the army and CIA adopted new reconnaissance and surveillance techniques, like drones carrying out continuous surveillance on key targets. Then there were the highly effective American precision munitions which comprised eight percent of U.S. fires in the Gulf War; 29 percent of NATO fires in Kosovo; and by the Iraq War in 2003 it was 68 percent. After that the use smart munitions became total, at least for industrialized nations that could afford it.

As successful as these new air reconnaissance tools and subsequent attacks were, they did not seem like a suitable long-term job for the air force. The other services disagreed and it took the better part of a decade after 2001 to get the air force to come around. In 2005 the air force deployed its first Predator drone unit and in 2009 it put its first Reapers to work. They were following the CIA in this area, which caused some misgivings among senior air force leadership.

What the CIA had pioneered was Persistent Surveillance with armed drones. That 24/7 observation enabled CIA or air force intel analysts to compile information about the target and order one or more missiles fired as soon as the key target was identified and located. This led to an ever growing list of terrorist leaders and their key subordinates killed in this way. At the same time this use of surveillance and precision weapons led to lower collateral casualties, usually nearby civilians, to plummet to historic and remarkable levels.

Air force traditionalists warned that in a conventional war this sort of thing would not work. Where the enemy had modern air defense systems and jet fighters, the Predator and Reaper drones would be impractical because they would be quickly shot down. But that is not the type of war being waged and it was pointed out to the air force that the military had to deal with what they are faced with, not just with what they prefer. Moreover, even in a conventional war, there is still work for these new tactics and the tech that makes it possible. The air force still disagreed, but did not have a persuasive alternative. The air force still wanted more money for the stealthy F-35 and a B2 and B21 stealth bomber. This despite the fact that other nations were developing more and more sensors that could nullify stealth.

Meanwhile, in Ukraine, the war against the Russian invaders led to an unexpected drone revolution. Ukrainians replaced most artillery and manned aircraft support, as well as many anti-tank weapons, with dozens of different drone designs. By 2025, thousands of drones were expended a day, while surveillance drones were not obliterated by air defenses and manned aircraft because there were so many small, cheap surveillance drones in action. They were hard to find, hard to hit and were watching everyone. When a target was spotted, the distant drone operators called in attack drones and the target was turned into debris and numerous casualties.

Air forces have been in this position before. This was seen during the 1960s when the U.S. air force and navy aviation suffered unexpectedly high aircraft losses because their aircraft and pilots were not prepared for the lower tech Russian aircraft used against them over Vietnam. This led aircraft to be again equipped with cannon because the new air-to-air missiles were not yet reliable enough to replace the previously despised autocannon.

Then came the concept of using your own aircraft for aggressor or dissimilar training. This began in 1969, when the U.S. Navy established the original Top Gun fighter pilot school. This was done in response to the poor performance of its pilots against North Vietnamese pilots flying Russian fighters and using Russian tactics. What made the Top Gun operation different was that the training emphasized how the enemy aircraft and pilots operated. This was called dissimilar training. In the past, American pilots practiced against American pilots, with everyone flying American aircraft and using American tactics. It worked in World War II, because the enemy pilots were not getting a lot of practice and were using similar aircraft and tactics anyway. Most importantly, there was a lot of aerial combat going on, providing ample opportunity for on-the-job training.

Not so in Vietnam, where the quite differently Russian-trained North Vietnamese were giving U.S. aviators an awful time. The four week Top Gun program solved the problem. The air force followed shortly with its Red Flag school. In the early 1980s, the Russians established a dissimilar air combat school, and the Chinese followed in 1987. Currently most major air forces use such a program. Smaller air forces send their pilots to commercial Top Gun/Red Flag programs, often staffed with retired veterans who were instructors at Top Gun or Red Flag.

The U.S. Air Force has another persistent problem that has not yet found a solution. This goes back to 1914 when World War I aircraft first became a factor in military affairs as they demonstrated their superior ability to see what the enemy was up to. Most of the use of air power at the beginning was about reconnaissance and preventing the enemy from seeing what you were doing.

Between the world wars, the idea of using air power as an offensive weapon developed. This proved to be more of a factor at sea than on land where reconnaissance was still the most useful service air forces provided. Strategic bombing was greatly misunderstood by air forces during and after World War II. Tactical bombing and strafing was more useful, because the fighter-bombers were providing reconnaissance at the same time they were attacking the enemy who were in the way of friendly ground troops. Moreover, the advancing ground forces could and often did report on the effectiveness of recent air strikes.

The U.S. Air Force, however, was not a big fan of tac air, as tactical air power was called, because they believed they could be more decisive with strategic bombing. The problem with World War II strategic bombing was that strategic bombing was a blunt instrument. A lot of damage was inflicted, but it was, for all practical purposes, random. So while millions of German and Japanese workers were diverted because they were dead or had to deal with damage to homes and businesses from the war effort by the bombing, there was no decisive effect, as the air force generals intended.

The 21st Century saw the unexpected development of effective BDA by using agents or cooperating civilians on the ground. Intelligence operations harvested cellphone photos taken in enemy territory. Soon troops or civilians on the ground were sending cellphone photos to bombers overhead. Strenuous measures were taken on the ground to prevent civilians and soldiers from taking photos of targets before and after air strikes. The cellphone was also used in Ukraine to track air attacks. By 2022 there were more cellphones than people in Ukraine. Civilians often developed effective tactics, like installing an air defense app on civilian phones. Thus equipped, civilians would take sound recordings and photos of incoming air strikes, usually by drones. Ukrainian air defense was much more effective because of the millions of Ukrainian civilians with this app on their phone. Any time there was Russian air, or even ground activity, Ukrainian military personnel would quickly, often in real time, take photos of the action

There was one drawback, military personnel and civilians living near key targets were vulnerable to detection by the enemy because cellphones transmitted their location. This enabled the enemy to make a quick accurate air, artillery or drone attack. It proved impossible to get all soldiers to refrain from using their phones in the combat zone. The phone was their only connection with home, but could be deadly for troops who used the phones too often. Most nations enacted rules forbidding troop use of cell phones in the combat zone. There were always enough soldiers and civilians who kept using their phones despite the danger. While the phones solved most BDA problems, their continued use in the combat zone still provided targeting information for the enemy. A long list of countermeasures, especially electronic jamming provided only partial relief.

The BDA Blues

October 23, 2025: Bomb Damage Assessment or BDA has, since the 1914-1918 World War I, sought unsuccessfully to determine how effective air strikes were. During the 1939-45 World War II, air and ground forces which depended on BDA were increasingly frustrated at the inability to get timely and accurate information on how effective their bombing missiles were. This has caused problems within air forces and with the ground forces being supported.

The U.S. Air Force has a well-deserved, and understandable, reputation for advocating military victory achieved mainly with air power. They still do, in spite of a historical record that will not cooperate. That said, the air force has some solid accomplishments to its credit. In some areas it has been extremely successful. This includes gaining and maintaining air supremacy wherever it operates in every American war since 1945.

But when it comes to influencing the war on the ground, the air force is much less dominant. Blame it all on BDA. This is the business of figuring out what to bomb, and what the impact on the enemy is after you bomb. Air force leaders were frequently deceived by the people on the ground being bombed. This began during World War II, when air forces used large scale aerial bombing for the first time, especially against economic targets in Germany between 1943 and 1945.

Right after World War II, the U.S. did a thorough survey of the impact of strategic bombing on Germany and Japan. It was discovered that the impact was far different from what BDA during the war had indicated. The air force vowed to do better next time. But as experience in 1950-3 Korea, 1965-72 Vietnam, 1991 Kuwait, 1999 Kosovo, 2003 Iraq, 2006 Lebanon and Ukraine since 2022 demonstrated, the enemy on the ground continued to have an edge when it came to deceiving the most energetic BDA efforts. The only proven technique for beating the BDA problem was to have people on the ground, up close, checking up on targets, while the fighting was going on. Those with powerful air forces do not want to do this because of the risk of some of their commandos getting killed or captured and because the intel and air force people were sure that they knew what enemy was up to down there by scrutinizing aerial photos. By the 21st Century the wide availability of commercial satellite photos enabled media and individuals to do

People on the ground have consistently demonstrated an ability to deceive aerial surveillance. Even during the early 21st century, when the U.S. developed persistent drone surveillance, the irregular forces they were facing proved capable of reducing the effectiveness of the drone effort. This spotlights another useful fact; air power can be useful on the ground but that happens over time and not quickly. The problem here is with voters and the media. Both demand quick victory and in the U.S. that has developed into the Three Year Rule in that American public support for a war no matter how enthusiastic it was at first, is largely gone after three years. If an air campaign can’t get it done in three years, that effort comes under media and political attack no matter how effective it has been.

But there's another problem. The army and air force have a different outlook on planning and risk. The air force sees warfare as a much tidier, and predictable, affair than does the army. In this respect, the air force and navy are closely aligned. Both are technical services, who are used to exercising more control over their forces than do army generals. The army sees warfare as more unpredictable and has adapted to that unpredictability. The army generals are usually skeptical of the air force's ability to take down foes from the air, and the army personnel are usually right.

Despite being successful high-tech outfits, American air forces, especially the Navy and USAF, frequently have trouble adjusting to changes they do not agree with. When the Cold War ended in 1991 the air force was still largely thinking about continuing to operate as they had done in the Cold War. But the technology and tactics of warfare were changing. The post-Cold War enemy was no longer large, organized forces spread over huge areas. The foes were increasingly irregulars who were harder to spot from the air. The air force reluctantly adapted, in part because the army and CIA adopted new reconnaissance and surveillance techniques, like drones carrying out continuous surveillance on key targets. Then there were the highly effective American precision munitions which comprised eight percent of U.S. fires in the Gulf War; 29 percent of NATO fires in Kosovo; and by the Iraq War in 2003 it was 68 percent. After that the use smart munitions became total, at least for industrialized nations that could afford it.

As successful as these new air reconnaissance tools and subsequent attacks were, they did not seem like a suitable long-term job for the air force. The other services disagreed and it took the better part of a decade after 2001 to get the air force to come around. In 2005 the air force deployed its first Predator drone unit and in 2009 it put its first Reapers to work. They were following the CIA in this area, which caused some misgivings among senior air force leadership.

What the CIA had pioneered was Persistent Surveillance with armed drones. That 24/7 observation enabled CIA or air force intel analysts to compile information about the target and order one or more missiles fired as soon as the key target was identified and located. This led to an ever growing list of terrorist leaders and their key subordinates killed in this way. At the same time this use of surveillance and precision weapons led to lower collateral casualties, usually nearby civilians, to plummet to historic and remarkable levels.

Air force traditionalists warned that in a conventional war this sort of thing would not work. Where the enemy had modern air defense systems and jet fighters, the Predator and Reaper drones would be impractical because they would be quickly shot down. But that is not the type of war being waged and it was pointed out to the air force that the military had to deal with what they are faced with, not just with what they prefer. Moreover, even in a conventional war, there is still work for these new tactics and the tech that makes it possible. The air force still disagreed, but did not have a persuasive alternative. The air force still wanted more money for the stealthy F-35 and a B2 and B21 stealth bomber. This despite the fact that other nations were developing more and more sensors that could nullify stealth.

Meanwhile, in Ukraine, the war against the Russian invaders led to an unexpected drone revolution. Ukrainians replaced most artillery and manned aircraft support, as well as many anti-tank weapons, with dozens of different drone designs. By 2025, thousands of drones were expended a day, while surveillance drones were not obliterated by air defenses and manned aircraft because there were so many small, cheap surveillance drones in action. They were hard to find, hard to hit and were watching everyone. When a target was spotted, the distant drone operators called in attack drones and the target was turned into debris and numerous casualties.

Air forces have been in this position before. This was seen during the 1960s when the U.S. air force and navy aviation suffered unexpectedly high aircraft losses because their aircraft and pilots were not prepared for the lower tech Russian aircraft used against them over Vietnam. This led aircraft to be again equipped with cannon because the new air-to-air missiles were not yet reliable enough to replace the previously despised autocannon.

Then came the concept of using your own aircraft for aggressor or dissimilar training. This began in 1969, when the U.S. Navy established the original Top Gun fighter pilot school. This was done in response to the poor performance of its pilots against North Vietnamese pilots flying Russian fighters and using Russian tactics. What made the Top Gun operation different was that the training emphasized how the enemy aircraft and pilots operated. This was called dissimilar training. In the past, American pilots practiced against American pilots, with everyone flying American aircraft and using American tactics. It worked in World War II, because the enemy pilots were not getting a lot of practice and were using similar aircraft and tactics anyway. Most importantly, there was a lot of aerial combat going on, providing ample opportunity for on-the-job training.

Not so in Vietnam, where the quite differently Russian-trained North Vietnamese were giving U.S. aviators an awful time. The four week Top Gun program solved the problem. The air force followed shortly with its Red Flag school. In the early 1980s, the Russians established a dissimilar air combat school, and the Chinese followed in 1987. Currently most major air forces use such a program. Smaller air forces send their pilots to commercial Top Gun/Red Flag programs, often staffed with retired veterans who were instructors at Top Gun or Red Flag.

The U.S. Air Force has another persistent problem that has not yet found a solution. This goes back to 1914 when World War I aircraft first became a factor in military affairs as they demonstrated their superior ability to see what the enemy was up to. Most of the use of air power at the beginning was about reconnaissance and preventing the enemy from seeing what you were doing.

Between the world wars, the idea of using air power as an offensive weapon developed. This proved to be more of a factor at sea than on land where reconnaissance was still the most useful service air forces provided. Strategic bombing was greatly misunderstood by air forces during and after World War II. Tactical bombing and strafing was more useful, because the fighter-bombers were providing reconnaissance at the same time they were attacking the enemy who were in the way of friendly ground troops. Moreover, the advancing ground forces could and often did report on the effectiveness of recent air strikes.

The U.S. Air Force, however, was not a big fan of tac air, as tactical air power was called, because they believed they could be more decisive with strategic bombing. The problem with World War II strategic bombing was that strategic bombing was a blunt instrument. A lot of damage was inflicted, but it was, for all practical purposes, random. So while millions of German and Japanese workers were diverted because they were dead or had to deal with damage to homes and businesses from the war effort by the bombing, there was no decisive effect, as the air force generals intended.

The 21st Century saw the unexpected development of effective BDA by using agents or cooperating civilians on the ground. Intelligence operations harvested cellphone photos taken in enemy territory. Soon troops or civilians on the ground were sending cellphone photos to bombers overhead. Strenuous measures were taken on the ground to prevent civilians and soldiers from taking photos of targets before and after air strikes. The cellphone was also used in Ukraine to track air attacks. By 2022 there were more cellphones than people in Ukraine. Civilians often developed effective tactics, like installing an air defense app on civilian phones. Thus equipped, civilians would take sound recordings and photos of incoming air strikes, usually by drones. Ukrainian air defense was much more effective because of the millions of Ukrainian civilians with this app on their phone. Any time there was Russian air, or even ground activity, Ukrainian military personnel would quickly, often in real time, take photos of the action

There was one drawback, military personnel and civilians living near key targets were vulnerable to detection by the enemy because cellphones transmitted their location. This enabled the enemy to make a quick accurate air, artillery or drone attack. It proved impossible to get all soldiers to refrain from using their phones in the combat zone. The phone was their only connection with home, but could be deadly for troops who used the phones too often. Most nations enacted rules forbidding troop use of cell phones in the combat zone. There were always enough soldiers and civilians who kept using their phones despite the danger. While the phones solved most BDA problems, their continued use in the combat zone still provided targeting information for the enemy. A long list of countermeasures, especially electronic jamming provided only partial relief.