September 8, 2008:  British special operations operatives have a motto; "who dares, wins." An example of how this doesn't work can be found in the American CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). Over the last three decades, the  CIA has come under a lot of criticism for not being able to do their job. They have done that by not taking chances. The most spectacular recent example was the failure to spot the terrorist operation that led to the September 11, 2001 attacks. While much blame was justifiably heaped on the FBI, it was the CIA that had first detected the plotters, and was already under orders to stop al Qaeda attempts to make more attacks on the United States. All this began a decade earlier, when al Qaeda damaged New York City's World Trade Center in 1993 bombing. The 2001 attacks did not come out of nowhere. But the CIA had problems at the top (where decisions about what leads to pursue, how, and to what extent all this is shared with the FBI), and at the bottom (and the inability to infiltrate al Qaeda.)

At the same time, other intelligence agencies, like Britain's MI-6 and the Israeli Mossad are much better at gathering information at ground level. They, like most nations, recognize that intelligence operations can get dirty. It's all a matter of how important the intelligence is. The British attitude is that, if you need to do this, do it right. So Britain does have agents with a "license to kill" and, more importantly, laws protecting these men and women from any later prosecution for dirty deeds they were asked to do for Queen and Country. But in the United States, the CIA was held to a higher moral standard, and still expected to get the job done. This approach did not work.

Despite all the post-911 talk about "more aggressive intelligence operations" to prevent more attacks, the atmosphere inside the CIA discouraged any such thing. All this was largely the result of the CIA being put into a sort of semi-hibernation in the late 1970s. This was an aftereffect of the Church Committee, an investigative operation sponsored by Congress, that sought to reform the CIA. The reforms were mainly about eliminating CIA spying inside the United States, and doing stuff for the president that Congress did not approve of. There was also a desire to avoid any CIA connection with foreign unpleasantness (like using unsavory people as spies or informants). This led to a growing list of restrictions on what the CIA could do overseas, and at home.

Congress was out to make sure no future president (the CIA works for the president) could use the CIA as had been done during the Vietnam war, and before. The CIA interpreted this as "no more James Bond stuff," just use your spy satellites and write up your reports. The Church Committee insured that the CIA became a much less interesting place to work. A lot of the most capable people got out over the next two decades. Recruiting became difficult. Word got around that the daring need not apply.

But after September 11, 2001, the CIA was tossed a huge pile of money and told to staff up and get going. The Church Committee restrictions were largely, if not completely, discarded. Recruiting efforts were greatly expanded, and since September 11, 2001, several hundred thousand applications were received. The agency has had a hard time keeping up with that.

This created some interesting personnel problems, especially in the operations division (the people who go to foreign countries and, well, sometimes do James Bond stuff.) There were few people left in the agency that remembered how to do field ops the old school way. By late 2001, many recently retired field ops guys were being lured back to active duty. You now had a situation where the field ops population was like a cross between a college fraternity and retirement community. There are few people in the middle, age and experience wise. It's almost as bad in the analysis division (where the data is studied and reports prepared.)

The area of the CIA that has flourished in the last three decades has been the geek side of things. These folks were always flush, thanks to a Congress that felt safer with spy satellites, than with spies on the ground. But those days are over. Much of the new technology is going to the analysts (better computerized tools to dig quickly through information) and the field operatives (like Predator UAVs, at four million bucks each.) A lot of money is going into training (learning Arabic, Pushto, Farsi and Dari are encouraged, and sometimes demanded) and the use of consultants (often former CIA operatives who would not come back full time.)

But after a few years, the Church Committee atmosphere returned. The major issue was the use of torture to extract information from terrorist suspects. It suddenly became the conventional wisdom that torture didn't work. This was absurd, as a cursory glance at the history of World War II, and every war before or since, would reveal. Pundits pointed out that tortured people will tell you anything. Again, this displayed an amazing ignorance of intelligence tradecraft. While some people will tell you anything when tortured, a lot of people will also provide useful information that can be double checked. It's not like the movies, where everything depends on the painful pronouncements of one tortured individual. The reality was that using "vigorous interrogation" brought forth much useful information, always has, and always will. Intelligence is all about putting together lots of small pieces. That's why U.S. operatives are taught how to resist torture. Yes, there are individuals who can outsmart, or outlast, torture. But they are always a minority. It's a war of numbers, and something that doesn't make for exciting soundbites.

The new Church Committee like restrictions outlawed things like the use of contractors for interrogations (even if there were no other source of manpower to do the job in time), the use of foreign nations to provide the "vigorous interrogation", the detention of foreigners without giving them access to the U.S. criminal justice system, and many more items that most CIA officials know, from their own experience, will only get Americans killed.

So how does the United States gather needed intelligence? It does it in secret (from many in Congress and, most of all, the media). The other intelligence agencies, like the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) are being allowed to run with these operations. Of course, everyone understands that they could still be hung out to dry down the road. But there are more bosses in the DIA (compared to the CIA) that are willing to back up their operatives (some of whom will get screwed down the road, which is accepted as a risk of the job). Another solution is to outsource many intel operations. The men and women who work for contractors are working without a net (of full U.S. government backing, both diplomatically and militarily). Not all these operatives are even American, but they will do it for a combination of money, adventure, personal beliefs and some assurances that America will provide some support if things get nasty (if only to retrieve the information the agents have obtained.)

The CIA lost its soul, it's heart, and most of its guts, in the late 1970s. Lots of brains are left, with big budgets to buy all manner of neat technology. But the bosses live fear of grandstanding politicians and headline hungry journalists. While the British, the Israelis, and most other nations, have managed to capture and retain the ability to do street level intelligence, the CIA has not. It now serves mainly to draw fire, while other organizations get the job done.