May 22, 2026: Iranian use of a group of small, fast boats to seize two container ships near the Strait of Hormuz indicates that American forces have not disabled Iran’s naval threat and highlights the challenges facing reopening one of the world’s most important oil export routes.

The American President recently recognized that while Iran’s traditional navy had been largely destroyed, its fast-attack ships had not been considered much of a threat.

He said any such vessels coming near the American blockade set up beyond the strait would be instantly eradicated using the same techniques deployed in the Caribbean and Pacific where American air strikes have hit alleged drug boats and killed at least 110 people.

Those boats were not assaulting large, unarmed commercial ships, however, nor nearly as heavily armed, with Iran’s Revolutionary Guards packing heavy machineguns, rocket launchers and, in some cases, anti-ship missiles.

Speedboat attacks now form part of a layered system of threats, combined with shore-based missiles, drones, mines and electronic interference to create ambiguity and slow down decision making. Iran was estimated to have hundreds, if not thousands, of these boats before the war, often hidden in coastal tunnels, naval bases or among civilian vessels, according to maritime security experts.

Some 100 or more may have been destroyed since the Iran war began in late February.

Until recently, Iran had relied on missile and drone strikes to hit shipping traffic around the strait, a route which normally handles twenty percent of the world’s daily oil and liquefied natural gas supply. Those attacks had stopped with the early April ceasefire.

The seizure of the two container ships by Iran followed American imposition of a blockade on Iran’s trade by sea.

The civilian shipping industry is not equipped to prevent Iranian armed forces from seizing vessels. Typically, about a dozen boats are used in a seizure operation. Iran’s fast boats now serve as the backbone of Iran’s naval strategy, able to deploy rapidly as part of its asymmetrical war against the enemy.

Because of their very high speeds, these boats can successfully carry out hit-and-run attacks without being detected, a shipping official said, speaking on condition of anonymity. Incorporating this week’s captures, Iran has used small, fast boats at least seven times going back to 2019.

High winds and swells in the waters off Iran during summer make it hard to conduct such operations, said. When it is very bumpy, the gunners involved cannot fire their weapons.

They are also ill-equipped to go head to head with a warship, and would likely suffer very heavy casualties in any direct assault on one. Even if they tried to saturate the ship’s defenses by attacking from many directions, they would be extremely vulnerable to the air support that would be called in.

Realistically, guided missile strikes would easily destroy these boats, but shoulder-fired missile launchers would pose a threat to low-flying American helicopters and aircraft. It is going to be much harder to eliminate the small boat threat than it was to destroy Iran’s larger naval vessels, which were large targets that were relatively easy to find and track and, at most, only had a limited ability to defend themselves from air attack.

The reality for the shipping sector is further disruption as well as higher insurance costs.

After the so-called tanker war of the 1980s, Iran increasingly used asymmetric tactics as the Iranian navy was effectively destroyed, much as it has been in the current conflict. When the American Navy and the American President said, We’ve destroyed the navy, we’ve sunk a frigate off Sri Lanka and you’ve done that before, but you’ve forgotten that your opposition went asymmetric. And they’ve improved it.