October 9, 2026: The term “Patriotic overseas Chinese” refers to those who migrated centuries ago but still maintain strong ties to China and support its cultural and political connections and the global Chinese community. Chinese President Xi Jinping has strongly urged overseas Chinese to assist their motherland and, at times, return to support growth and progress in the country they came from. Xi maintains that patriotism and support for the motherland are obligations for overseas Chinese. Xi encourages them to participate in national projects, promote cultural exchange, and support peaceful reunification with Taiwan. While many mainlanders consider Taiwanese overseas Chinese, the residents of Taiwan consider themselves a separate country and are arming themselves to protect that independence.

Meanwhile, China has other ways to exploit overseas Chinese. For decades, China has been using an espionage system called "a thousand grains of sand." It is nothing new. Other nations have used similar systems for centuries. What is unusual is the scale of the Chinese effort. The Chinese intelligence bureaucracy inside China is huge, with nearly 100,000 people working just to keep track of the many Chinese overseas, and what they could, or should, do to try to grab for the motherland.

Chinese intelligence officials try to talk with Chinese students and businesspeople before they leave the country to study or do business, and after they return. They ask those going to the West to bring back anything that might "help the motherland." Most of these people were not asked to act as spies, but simply to share whatever information they obtained with Chinese government officials (who are not always identified as intelligence personnel).

Of course, China and Western intelligence agencies soon learned what was going on. Quiet diplomatic efforts over the years to get the Chinese to back off were politely ignored. Another problem is that China has never been energetic at enforcing intellectual property laws. If a Chinese student returned with valuable technical information (obtained in a classroom, at work, or simply while socializing), they often passed it to Chinese companies or military organizations that could use it. Because few individuals brought back large amounts of data or material (memory cards full of technical data, or actual components or devices), foreign counterintelligence agencies found it hard to catch Chinese "spies." Thousands of them went back to China with secrets in their heads. How do you stop that?

Some of the more ambitious spies, like the Mak family, were caught red-handed with actual objects. But most of the swarm moved back to China unhindered. Naturally, the Chinese pushed their system as far as they could. Why not? There was little risk. The Chinese offered large cash rewards to Chinese who could bring back particularly valuable items. Chinese intelligence looked on these "purchases" as strictly commercial transactions. If the Chinese "spies" got caught, they were on their own. The Chinese involved knew the rules. If they succeeded, they won favor with the government, or even made a pile of money, and the Chinese government was willing to approve whatever business deals these "patriotic" Chinese tried to put together back in China. This kind of clout is important in China, where a "friend in the government" is more valuable than in the West. But more of these ambitious Chinese agents are getting caught as the Western business and academic community becomes aware of what is going on. Over ten million Americans and Europeans have Chinese ancestry. Many are recent immigrants, or simply students or people working in Canada temporarily for Chinese companies. They all have family back in China and are thus vulnerable to recruitment, usually unwillingly, as one of the "thousand grains of sand" who provide any information they can to Chinese intelligence officials, who use it to improve the economy, military, foreign relations, or intelligence services.

James F Dunnigan