June 11, 2026: Last month America and Nigeria revealed that they had killed Abu-Bilal al-Minuki, who was in charge of the ISWAP/Islamic State West Africa Province’s GDP/General Directorate of Provinces. ISWAP is one of the most destructive Islamic terrorist groups in Africa. This was not the first time al-Minuki has been described as dead or missing. American forces intervened in late 2025 with air strikes, followed by ground forces in 2026. While the Nigerian ground and air forces had been successful in finding and attacking Boko Haram and ISWAP militants, the addition of American airpower and surveillance capabilities make it possible to track and attack Islamic terrorists more quickly and with deadlier results. The late 2025 American air strikes killed as many as 300 Islamic terrorists. The subsequent ground operations left as many as 200 more Islamic terrorists dead. America had long been conducting air strikes on Islamic terrorists in East Africa, using Reaper drones operating from Djibouti, but the current attacks in West Africa are a new front in the war on Islamic terrorism.

Last year there was an increase in Islamic terrorist activity, particularly by ISWAP and Boko Haram. Including ethnic fighting between farmers and herders in northwest Nigeria, there were about 150 deaths. In 2024 it was noted that since 2020 the Islamic terrorism groups faded away while ethnic tribal violence became responsible for most casualties. In 2024 kidnapping increased with over 600 people kidnapped for ransom. Most of this took place in the northern states of Borno and Kaduna. There were nationwide protests over cost-of-living increases. The Islamic terror groups’ main activity was staying alive, and they did so via banditry. Back in 2004, Islamic terrorist violence in the northeast appeared and created some lasting problems. There are still millions of refugees plus substantial economic damage in northeastern Borno State, where it all began. There seems to be no end in sight because of local corruption, but more competent leadership in the security forces reduced the violence. All this was caused by a local group of Taliban wannabes calling themselves Boko Haram. Their activity in the capital of Borno State grew for a decade until by 2014 it seemed unstoppable. It took over a year for the government to finally muster sufficient military strength to cripple but not destroy Boko Haram. This did not get much media attention outside Africa, even though in 2014 Boko Haram killed more people than ISIL did in Syria and Iraq. The main reason for Boko Haram gains in 2014 and 2015 was corruption in the army, which severely crippled effective counterterror efforts. By itself Boko Haram was too small to have much impact on a national scale but the inability to deal with this problem put a spotlight on the corruption that has hobbled all progress in Nigeria for decades.

A new president was elected in 2023 and made considerable progress in changing the corruption. This included problems with tribal feuds and growing unrest throughout the country. This has been especially bad down south in the oil producing region of the Niger River Delta. Violence against oil facilities continues, in part because local politicians and business leaders are part of the oil theft business. Northern Moslems want more influence over the federal government and a bigger share of the oil money. In northern and central Nigeria, you have increasing violence as nomadic Moslem herders move south and clash with largely Christian farmers over land use and water supplies. For the last few years these tribal feuds have killed more people than Boko Haram. The situation is still capable of sliding into regional civil wars, over money and political power. Corruption and ethnic/tribal/religious rivalries threaten to trigger, at worse, another civil war and, at least, more street violence and public anger.

Earlier this year Boko Haram embraced digital technology using encrypted apps like Telegram and WhatsApp to communicate. This went beyond carrying out new attacks. These apps also allowed Boko Haram to not only communicate securely but to also recruit new members, plan attacks and coordinate operations. One important operation is to spread disinformation on apps or social media sites that a lot of Nigerians frequent. Most of the messages go out in Hausa, the language of the Moslem north. Most Nigerians understand a local dialect of English and standard English is the official language for government, education, and business. Boko Haram exploits this widespread use of English to share their propaganda with more than a billion English speakers worldwide. Although Boko Haram literally means Western Education is Forbidden, this Islamic terrorist group educates themselves, or recruits’ members who are well educated, to help with communications and propaganda.

Unencrypted apps like TikTok, along with propaganda videos in Social Media sites, can enrage Muslims who will then attack their Christian neighbors. Boko Haram regularly spreads false accusations of Christians abusing Moslems and, before the accusations can be proven false, a lot of mayhem, deaths, injuries and tarnished reputations can occur. Given the nearly universal adoption of cellphones in Nigeria, this Boko Haram propaganda and other messages find a large audience and an endless supply of new recruits or supporters.

The oil-rich west coast African nation of Nigeria continues to have problems with Islamic terrorist groups Boko Haram and especially the local ISIL/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant faction known as ISWAP. The latest disaster was an early May 4 ISWAP attack on an army supercamp in northeastern Yobe State. This attack featured the ISWAP use of motorbikes instead of 4x4 vehicles. Yobe State terrain is flat with little cover. ISWAP found motorbikes more effective than larger vehicles. The attack on the supercamp left four soldiers dead and many more wounded. ISWAP gunmen vandalized part of the camp for several hours. They got away with weapons, ammunition and other supplies. ISWAP has stuck with its strategy of concentrating on the security forces and doing so by assembling a large enough number of gunmen to ensure, most of the time, a quick victory.

The continued prevalence of corruption and incompetent officers in the Nigerian army has contributed to continued chaos and lawlessness in northern Borno State, where most of the population was displaced by Boko Haram violence in 2014-15 and when Boko Haram control was broken by 2017. After that government programs to revive the economy and restore law and order collapsed under the usual corruption and incompetence of local officials and security forces. Even a reform-minded president who was a former general and Moslem was unable to push military reforms far enough and fast enough. Boko Haram is not winning; but the government is failing to finish off a defeated Boko Haram and take advantage of an opportunity to regain the trust and loyalty of the local population. ISIL took advantage of similar conditions to quickly overrun more than a third of Iraq in 2014. Many Nigerian leaders are well aware of how that worked but the corruption is so entrenched and widespread that reform moves slowly and that left the army and government officials vulnerable to a well-organized Boko Haram comeback.

ISWAP is also known as the Barnawi or AL Barnawi faction of Boko Haram. ISWAP has apparently received a lot of useful technical and tactical advice from ISIL veterans of fighting in Iraq, Syria and Libya. Boko Haram persists in the northeast in large part because of its willingness to experiment, innovate and take advice from foreign ISIL veterans. The Barnawi faction follows the current ISIL doctrine of concentrating attacks on security forces and government officials, preferably the corrupt ones. That makes it easier to extort more cash and other goods from the local population.

In 2019 the Barnawi faction had over 3,000 active gunmen and operated mainly in the far north of Borno state near Lake Chad and the borders of Niger and Chad. The smaller Shekau faction has about half as many armed men and operates further south near the Borno State capital of Maiduguri and the Sambisa Forest. Both factions rely on the fact that the years of Boko Haram violence in Borno State, where Boko Haram originated in 2004, has increased the poverty and corruption the Islamic terrorist organization was founded to eliminate. Many potential recruits are discouraged by stricter standards and a more fanatic approach by Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Compared to the original Boko Haram, the most hard core Islamic radicals are drawn to the more extreme groups and that way Boko Haram persists.

Current ISWAP strength is closer to 4,000 fighters. Boko Haram is still around, with fewer gunmen than ISWAP. Both of these Islamic terrorist organizations have been fighting each other since 2021. The army has taken advantage of this, but corruption and frequent incompetence have enabled the Islamic terrorist groups to continue surviving. The government has tried to exploit the Islamic terrorists’ civil war.

Back in 2020 some army commanders in the northeastern Borno State tried to blame foreign NGOs/Non-Government Organizations for providing a steady flow of reports, documented with pictures and videos showing army misbehavior and mistreatment of civilians. The foreigners were also accused of spying for Boko Haram and deliberately spreading false reports of army misbehavior to hurt the morale of troops and loyalty of local civilians. These accusations tended to be quickly withdrawn when senior officers back in the national capital heard of it. The generals in the high command knew the NGO reports were true because these reports were often quietly double-checked by high command investigators. Such retractions were just another reminder of the problems the military faces and is unable to fix in the northeast.