January 5, 2026: Ukraine has advised its NATO supporters to pay close attention to the Ukrainian experience to better defend themselves from a possible Russian attack in the next ten years. Drones were an unexpected development that had a huge impact on how battles in Ukraine's current war are fought. Drones were successful because they were cheap, easily modified, and expendable. Modifications and upgrades could be implemented quickly and inexpensively Both Russian and Ukrainian forces were soon using cheap quadcopter drones controlled by soldiers a few kilometers distant using FPV/First Person Viewing goggles to see what the day/night video camera on the drone can see. Adding night vision is available when needed, at a higher cost per drone. These drones cost a few hundred dollars each with the most complex models going for about a thousand dollars. Most of these drones carry half a kilogram of explosives, so operators can instantly turn the drone into a flying bomb that can fly into a target and detonate. Some drones carry more explosives depending on what is needed to deal with a target.

These drones are awesome and debilitating weapons when used in large numbers. If a target isn’t moving or requires more explosive power that the drones can supply, one of the drone operators can call in artillery, rocket, or missile fire, or even an airstrike. Larger, fixed wing drones are used for long range, often over a thousand kilometers, operations against targets deep inside Russia.

Drones are usually able to complete their mission, whether it is a one-way attack or reconnaissance and surveillance. The recon missions are usually survivable and enable the drone to be reused. All these drones are constantly performing surveillance, which means that both sides commit enough drones to maintain constant surveillance over a portion of the front line, to a depth, into enemy territory, of at least a few kilometers. Longer range drones can track Russian operations hundreds of kilometers behind the front lines.

This massive use of FPV-armed drones has revolutionized warfare in Ukraine and both sides are producing as many as they can. Russia initially produced its own drones now after briefly using imported Iranian Shahed-136 drones that cost over $100,000 each. Ukraine demonstrated that you could design and build drones with similar capabilities at less than a tenth of that. The Iranian drone was more complex than it needed to be, and even the Russians soon realized this and turned from the Shahed-136 for more capable drones they copied from Ukrainian designs or their own. Russia still uses their Shahed drones because they have a factory to build them and the more airborne drones they can send on a mission, the better the chance that some will hit the target. There are also larger fixed-wing drones that can drop bombs or release smaller attack drones. These larger bomber drones can also transport supplies to troops who are hard to reach otherwise.

Ukraine has also developed land-based drone vehicles/DVs for carrying supplies or bringing back casualties. DVs have revolutionized combat zone transportation. The DVs are operated remotely and can often make a trip autonomously. In Ukraine, the battlefield is increasingly dominated by unmanned air and land vehicles. The operators stay in bunkers and rarely venture out. The combat zone is under constant surveillance and if infantry advance, they do so in small groups under the protections of their own drones.

Conventional artillery, mortar and rocket weapons have had to change the way they operate. They must fire a few rounds quickly and move before counterfire hits them. Because of this, these weapons are less effective and drones now account for over 80 percent of casualties. Tanks and other armored vehicles are similarly constrained and have to be used infrequently lest they be swarmed by drones and destroyed or immobilized.

Military leaders in other nations have noted this and are scrambling to equip their own forces with the most effective drones. Not having enough of these to match the number the enemy has in a portion of the front means you are at a serious disadvantage in that area. These drones are still evolving in terms of design and use and are becoming more effective and essential.

One countermeasure that can work for a while is electronic jamming of the drones’ control signal. Drone guidance systems are constantly modified or upgraded to cope with this. Most drones have flight control software that sends drones with jammed control signals back to where they took off to land for reuse. The jammers on the ground can be attacked by drones programmed to home in on the jamming signal. Countermeasures can be overcome and the side that can do this more quickly and completely has an advantage. That advantage is usually temporary because both sides are putting a lot of effort into keeping their combat drones effective on the battlefield.

The widespread use of drones has tuned combat brigades, battalions and companies into avid users of drones. While Ukraine has a separate Drone Force for developing new drones and assessing the use of current ones, most drones are used by regular combat units. Some of these units are selected to test new drones or drone concepts.

Ukraine has long been a major developer and manufacturer of weapons and military equipment. Before 1991, when Ukraine was a part of the Soviet Union, these innovation and manufacturing capabilities were recognized and encouraged. Since independence in 1991 Ukraine has continued to encourage its defense firms to continue their work. This has resulted in several new weapons and upgrades for existing systems.

In 2021 Ukrainian introduced its Neptune anti-ship missile and, starting two months after the 2022 Russian invasion, Neptune was used to cripple and eventually neutralize the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

Neptune was first used in April 2022 to attack and sink the 12,000-ton Moskva, flagship of Russia’s Black Sea fleet. Moskva was hit by two Neptunes. Russia denied this and said the explosions and fires on the Moskva were the result of an accident on the ship that damage-control efforts by the 500-man crew were unable to handle, leading to major ammunition explosions.

Moskva was directing operations off the Ukrainian port of Odessa at the time. As the flagship of the Black Sea fleet, Moskva had senior officers and their staffs on board to plan and direct Russian efforts to attack Ukrainian ports, especially Odessa, and turn Ukraine into a landlocked nation.

Russia later admitted Moskva sank while being towed back to its home port in the nearby Crimean Peninsula. Russia will not admit Moskva was hit by two Ukrainian anti-ship missiles because the Moskva had multiple defenses against such attacks. Apparently, Ukraine used one or more of their Turkish TB2 UAVs to track and harass Moskva and that enabled the two Neptune missiles to get through and start the fires that the crew could not handle and led to the abandon ship order. Ukraine may also have used ECM/ Electronic Countermeasures on Moskva to enable the missile strike.

Russia tried to blame the loss of the ship on massive crew incompetence rather than admit the ship was hit by two Ukrainian missiles. To do so would also include crew incompetence by not turning on all the anti-missile defenses because they were distracted by the Ukrainian UAVs. It might also indicate that the missile defenses were inadequate. With the ship at the bottom of the Black Sea, the surviving crew had to explain what happened and why.

NATO nations supplying Ukraine with weapons have noted that Ukraine manages to continue developing and producing new weapons while under constant attack by Russian missiles and have agreed to joint-production and development deals inside Ukraine, some of them before the war is over. Ukraine had sought such co-op deals before the Russian invasion but there was little interest from NATO nations until they saw Ukrainian capabilities under wartime conditions.